This is the fourth part in a series on the recent Central Virginia Battlefield Trust spring seminar: The Road to Fredericksburg
The First Defenders Civil War Round Table had the opportunity in March 2024 to hear Greg Mertz present on the Battle of Cedar Mountain, but while this similarly titled program still touted “Jackson is with you!” the focus was quite different.
Events leading up to the August 9th, 1862, clash near 
Culpepper began weeks earlier in Washington, D.C. In early July, the Confederates could claim a strategic victory in the wake of the Seven Days battle by having turned George McClellan’s Army of the Potomac back from the gates of Richmond. Although McClellan would also claim a strategic victory by having inflicted more casualties on the Confederates, President Abraham Lincoln was already thinking anew.
John Pope had already been brought east to command the newly-forming Army of Virginia. In the absence of a general-in-chief at the time, Pope, a Republican and acquaintance of the president, would have more than a little time to offer military advice. It was also during this time that Ambrose Burnside, also in Washington, would receive the first of three offers to assume command of the Army of the Potomac.
On the other side of the lines, Robert E. Lee was still gaining control of his confident Army of Northern Virginia. It would be another four months before the Confederate Congress would approve the organization of army corps and the rank of lieutenant general to lead them, and Lee was taking his measure of his division commanders. Although he admired Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s success during the spring in the Shenandoah Valley, Lee had concerns with Jackson’s leadership style. Most especially concerning was his unwillingness to take his subordinate commanders into his confidence when issuing battle plans, and some of the Valley victories were more the result of luck (and blunders by the enemy) than from skill.
The three different armies from three different departments that Jackson had defeated in detail were now being combined into a single army that would be commanded in the field by John Pope. Before he took to the field, though, Pope would issue a trio of orders that would change the conduct of the war.
Because Confederate guerillas were damaging critical bridges, railroads and other infrastructure, and because it was widely presumed local civilians were supporting the guerillas, Pope ordered that civilians within five miles of destroyed property would either be required to repair it or to pay damages.
The second order allowed the army to “live off the land” and take civilian resources. Vouchers would be issued, and the aggrieved civilian could be reimbursed by the federal government if he could provide proof of his loyalty to the union.
Finally, Pope ordered southerners caught behind union lines to be sent outside of those lines. Any who returned and were captured would be subject to execution.
During his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War that fall, Pope would hint that his orders had been sanctioned by “official Washington.” Whether a stretch or not, that summer Lincoln was already coming to the conclusion the war had to be conducted in a different way, and his emancipation plans had already been discussed by his cabinet in July. The “accepted rules of war” were being changed, and the policies adopted by the Union Army toward civilians at Fredericksburg during the coming December had their roots with John Pope a full five months earlier.
Lee would shift Jackson’s division of around 17,000 men toward Gordonsville in an effort to block Pope’s advance and protect the local populace from the outrages of his proclamations. He would also expand Jackson’s command by transferring A.P. Hill’s troops. In the process, Lee would write and provide advice to Jackson suggesting he make it a point to consult with his division commanders and advise them of his plans. Lee said he hoped that such a policy would save Jackson difficulties that attended his increased command.
Lee had heard about some of the difficulties Jackson had following his only real battle loss at Kernstown, and he was well-aware that Jackson had court-martial proceedings in progress against Brigadier General Richard Garnett as a result of that battle. Indeed, that trial was in progress on the eve of the Cedar Mountain fight, and even Jackson’s staff admitted things were going badly for the general. Although the evidence is sketchy, there is some suggestion that Jackson sought out battle with an isolated federal detachment as an excuse to adjourn the Garnett court-martial. It would never be reconvened.
Style does not change, however. Jackson issued marching orders to his three division commanders, but he subsequently modified them without letting them know. As a result, the order of march was confused, and southern troops would arrive at Cedar Mountain in the wrong order and without a clear understanding of Jackson’s battle plan.
Nathaniel Banks’ troops, although outnumbered, had things much their own way for most of the battle. Only the timely arrival of reinforcements (led by A.P. Hill in a dress rehearsal for a similar feat a month later at Sharpsburg), along with the personal inspiration of Jackson at a critical moment, would pull victory from the jaws of defeat. In fact, Jackson would attempt to lead his troops by drawing his sword, something he had not done for so long that it was rusted in its scabbard! Still, he would wave the sword and scabbard together to advance his troops to final victory.
As a side note, Union officers captured on the field after the battle would not be afforded the usual accommodations of prisoners-of-war. Rather, they were held in captivity to be executed in return for any civilians who died as a result of Pope’s proclamation.
The Civil War began to change during the summer of 1862 both militarily and politically, and Abraham Lincoln knew he had to have victories to bring an end to the conflict. He would get a partial victory in September at Antietam that would allow him to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, but he would need something more glorious before it would become official on January 1st, 1863. That chance would come in December… at Fredericksburg.
April 14th: “Another Ball’s Bluff: the Battle of Shepherdstown and the End of the Maryland Campaign”
